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In modelling farm systems it is widely accepted that risk plays a central role. Furthermore, farmers’ risk 
aversion determines their decisions in both the short and the long run. This paper presents a 
methodology based on multiple criteria mathematical programming to obtain relative and absolute risk 
aversion coefficients. We rely on multiattribute utility theory (MAUT) to elicit a separable additive 
multiattribute utility function and then estimate the risk aversion coefficients and apply this 
methodology to an irrigated area of Northern Spain. The results show a wide variety of attitudes to risk 
among farmers, who mainly exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) and constant relative 
risk aversion (CRRA). 
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1. Introduction 
 
Risk is present in all management decisions of agricultural systems, as a result of price, yield 
and resource uncertainty. If farmers were risk-neutral, it would be irrelevant to consider risk 
in their decision-making process, since their responses could be represented by the 
maximization of the expected profit. However, farmers’ generalized risk aversion results in 
production decisions that conflict with those that would be regarded as optimal from a social 
point of view. This fact has brought agricultural economists to devote a great deal of attention 
to the stabilization features of agricultural policies aimed at reducing farming risk. 
 
The degree of attention to the behaviour of agricultural producers under risk has recently 
been increased by the progressive liberalization of the world agricultural markets (Hope and 
Lingard, 1992; Berg, 1997; Oglethorpe, 1997), and the ever-increasing importance of 
environmental considerations (Lambert, 1990; Babcock, 1992; Parks, 1995; Babcock and 
Hennessy, 1996; Bontems and Thomas, 2000). 
 
1.1. Expected utility theory and the measure of the risk aversion of producers 
 
In the context of risk, expected utility theory (EUT), forgotten until Von Neuman and 
Morgenstern (1944), has been the basis for much decision-making theory. EUT assumes 
that the preferences of the decision maker comply with the axioms of ordering, continuity and 
independence
1, and that there is a utility function U that assigns a numerical value to each 
alternative
2. In doing so, EUT allows the ranking of alternatives within the risk context. 
 
The seminal works of Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965) paid attention to one of the key 
elements of decision theory, i.e., the measure of risk aversion of the economic agents. These 
authors proposed two indicators that overcame the limitations in the use of a cardinal utility 
function to compare differences in risk attitudes. The first is the absolute risk aversion 
coefficient (ra). Mathematically, this coefficient is calculated as follows: 
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This coefficient can be interpreted as the percentage change in marginal utility caused by 
each monetary unit of gain or loss (Raskin and Cochram, 1986). Thus, the coefficient ra takes 
either positive or negative values for risk-loving or risk-averse economic agents respectively. 
 
When the coefficient decreases as the monetary value increases we have decreasing 
absolute risk aversion (DARA). Alternatively, if the coefficient increases under the same set 
of circumstances we have increasing absolute risk aversion (IARA). Finally, if the coefficient 
does not change across the monetary level, the decision maker exhibits constant absolute 
risk aversion (CARA), which implies that the level of the argument of the utility function does 
not affect his or her decisions under uncertainty.  
 
Since ra is not a non-dimensional measure of risk aversion, its value is dependent on the 
currency in which the monetary units are expressed. To overcome the impossibility of 
comparing risk aversion among different economic agents we have devised a non-
dimensional measure; the relative risk aversion coefficient (rr): 
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1 These axioms have been under severe criticism in many applied studies. A revision can be found in Starmer 
(2000). However, EUT benefits from the credit of most agricultural economists (Schoemaker, 1982; Robison and 
Hanson, 1997). 
2 As most economic decisions are expressed in monetary terms, the utility function may have wealth as argument 
(U(W)), measuring the satisfaction from a given amount of money. However, it is also used the satisfaction from 
either a gain or a loss (U(X)) (Hardaker et al., 1997, p.94-95).   3
This second coefficient measures the percentage change of marginal utility in terms of the 
percentage change in the monetary variable; hence, rr represent the elasticity of the marginal 
utility function, which ranges from 0.5 (slightly risk-averse) to 4 (extremely risk-averse)
3. As 
with the absolute risk aversion coefficient, we can find decreasing, constant or increasing 
relative risk-aversion behaviour (DRRA, CRRA and IRRA, respectively). 
 
All theoretical aspects of EUT related to agricultural economics have been discussed in 
classic works such as those of Dillon (1971), Anderson et al. (1977), Barry (1984), Robison 
and Barry (1987) and Hardaker et al. (1997). 
 
1.2. Literature review 
 
According to Young (1979), Lins et al. (1981) and Robison et al. (1984) there are three basic 
methods of measuring the attitudes to risk of agricultural producers: 
 
§ Direct estimation of the utility function. This method involves direct interaction with the 
decision maker, who expresses his or her preferences among various alternatives. 
Regression techniques then enable us to obtain their utility function. Examples can be 
found in Officer and Halter (1968), Francisco and Anderson (1972), Lin et al. (1974), 
Dillon and Scandizzo (1978), Halter and Mason (1978), Bond and Wonder (1980), 
Hamal and Anderson (1982), Sri-Ramaratmam et al. (1987) and Feinerman and 
Finkelshtain (1996). 
§ Experimental methods. This can be regarded as a variant of the previous method, in 
which real bets are used instead of hypothetical gains and losses. See for example 
Binswanger (1980 and 1981) and Binswanger and Sillers (1983). 
§ Observed economic behaviour. This method is based on the difference between the 
observed behaviour and that predicted by the empirical models. Furthermore, these 
models rely on either production theory under uncertainty (econometric models) or 
cropping pattern selection (mathematical programming). Wolgin (1975), Moscardi and 
Janvry (1977), Antle (1987 and 1989), Myers (1989), Chavas and Holt (1990 and 
1996), Pope and Just (1991), Saha et al. (1994), Saha (1997) and Bar-Shira et al. 
(1997) present good examples of the first category, while for the latter we have Wiens 
(1976) and Brink and McCarl (1978). 
 
All the above approaches have their drawbacks (see Young, 1979; Binswanger, 1980 and 
Lins et al., 1981), which are most important in the direct estimation method due to interviewer 
bias, the selection of probabilities, reluctance to play lottery games, lack of reality of the 
scenarios in place and/or insufficient experience on the part of the decision maker in the 
evaluation of hypothetical situations. 
 
Even though these limitations can be reduced, to certain extent, by adopting the 
experimental method, this has often proved difficult to implement in practice, since the 
financial cost involved in a real situation with many producers is too high. 
 
With respect to observed economic behaviour there are also some difficulties, such as the 
influence of other non-monetary objectives in the decision-making process (e.g. leisure, 
management complexity, etc.) and constraints (financial limitations, lack of technical 
information, etc.) that “contaminate” attitudes to risk. If this method is adopted, therefore, it 
would not be correct to explain any behaviour that differs from profit maximization purely in 
terms of risk aversion. 
 
                                                        
3 Anderson and Dillon (1991) classify agricultural producers according the rr(W) coefficient. Although most authors 
consider value above 5-10 very unlikely (Kocherlakota, 1996), there are some studies reporting value up to 30 
(Kandel and Stambaugh, 1991). According to them, these value can be reasonable when the alternatives in place 
represent a gain or loss of 1% of the total wealth.   4
In considering the econometric approach, the need for long time series and/or cross-
sectional data on input use, production level and other relevant economic variables limits this 
alternative to specific groups of farmers for whom first-class data are available, a rather 
uncommon situation in agriculture. 
 
In this paper we present a methodology based on mathematical programming that enables 
us to discriminate between the effect of the risk attitude of the producer on his or her 
decision-making and other criteria. This methodology, which resorts to the multiple criteria 
paradigm to estimate risk aversion coefficients, requires a minimum amount of data, making 
it a pragmatic approach to any real agricultural system in spite of limited availability of data. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the methodology used to calculate 
farmers’ risk aversion coefficients. Section 3 presents the area of study in which the 
methodology was applied, while the results are summarized in Section 4. We conclude the 
paper by drawing some important conclusions about the pragmatic advantages of this 
approach. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
 
2.1. Decision theory and the analysis of risk attitudes 
 
One of the basic principles of classical Economic Theory is that entrepreneurs behave as 
profit maximizers. Following this principle, modelling the decision-making of agricultural 
producers could be achieved by the maximization of single-objective models. Real-life 
observations refute this simplification. 
 
Expected utility theory was a first step in the direction of broadening the profit maximizer 
assumption and including higher moments of the expected profit. However, EUT has been 
criticised for limiting its application to a single attribute: the pay-off (or wealth). Many authors 
have demonstrated the convenience of considering more than one attribute in the producer’s 
utility function: e.g. Harman et al. (1972), Gasson (1973), Smith and Capstick (1976), Harper 
and Eastman (1980), Kliebenstein et al. (1980), Patrick and Blake (1980), Cary and Holmes 
(1982), Sumpsi et al. (1993 and 1997), Gómez-Limón and Berbel (1995), Berbel and 
Rodríguez (1998) and Amador et al. (1998). All these studies suggest that farmers’ decision-
making processes are driven by additional criteria to the expected profit (or higher moments), 
such as the maximization of leisure, the minimization of managerial problems, the 
minimization of working capital, etc. 
 
Hence, the decision maker maximizes his or her expected utility following a function with 
profit (X) as one argument plus other attributes (Y1, Y2,…Yn). The problem is thus reduced to 
the maximization of a multiattribute utility function (Robison, 1982): 
 
Max  E [U (X, Y1,....Yn)]                                                 (3) 
 
If the Y1,....Yn attributes are not considered, the objective function becomes: 
 
    Max E [U (X, å )]                                                        (4) 
 
where the å term represents the error from omitting the other attributes. Hitherto, this has 
been the usual EUT approach to modelling the behaviour of economic agents under 
uncertainty. According to Robison (1982, p.374), predictions made by the single-attribute 
utility function cannot be accurate enough since there are other attributes involved in the 
decision-making process. 
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Having considered the above-mentioned findings, we have opted to model farmers’ 
behaviour by means of multiattribute utility theory (MAUT), an approach, largely developed 
by Keeney and Raiffa (1976), that overcomes the limitations of the single-attribute utility 
function. The multiattribute approach attaches a cardinal value to each alternative, and 
considers the aggregated effect of all attributes. The difficulties arise in the first place from 
the mathematical form of each individual utility function and secondly from the aggregation of 
all values (Herath, 1981; Hardaker et al., 1997). 
 
2.2. Multiple-criteria technique to calculate the risk aversion coefficients 
 
§ Elicitation of the multiattribute utility function 
 
Although the conditions for the assumption of an additive utility function are somewhat 
restrictive
4, Edwards (1977), Farmer (1987) and Huirne and Hardaker (1998) have shown 
that the additive function yields extremely close approximations to the hypothetical true 
function even when these conditions are not satisfied
5. 
 
The ranking of alternatives is obtained by adding the contributions of each attribute. Since 
attributes are measured in different units, normalisation is required to allow addition. The 
weighting of each attribute expresses its relative importance. In mathematical terms, the 
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where U is the utility value of alternative k, wi is the weight of attribute i and ui(rk) is the value 
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This formulation implies linear utility-indifferent curves (constant partial marginal utility), a 
rather strong assumption that can be regarded as a close enough approximation if the 
attributes vary within a narrow range (Edwards, 1977; Hardaker et al., 1997, p.165). There is 
some evidence for this hypothesis in agriculture. Thus, Huirne and Hardaker (1998) show 
how the slope of the single-attribute utility function has little impact on the ranking of 
alternatives. Likewise, Amador et al. (1997) analyse how linear and quasi-concave functions 
yield almost the same results. As a consequence, we assume this simplification in the 
elicitation of the additive utility function. 
 
Following the methodology developed by Sumpsi et al. (1993 and 1997) with some 
modifications, we elicit the additive multiattribute utility function. The method may be 
summarised as follows: 
 
1. Each attribute j is defined as a mathematical function of decision variables  X
r
 (e.g. 
crop area); fj = fj ( X
r
). These attributes are proposed a priori as the most relevant 
decision-making criteria that are utilised by farmers (usually profit, risk, etc.). 
                                                        
4 If the attributes are mutually utility independent the utility function U= U(x1, x2, ..., xn) becomes U= f{u1(x1), u2(x2), 
..., un(xn)} and takes either the additive form: U(x1, x2, ..., xn)= S wiui(xi), or multiplicative form: U(x1, x2, ..., xn)= 
{P(Kwiui(xi)+ 1)- 1}/K, where 0£wi£1 and K= f(wi). If the attributes are mutually utility independent and S wi= 
1, then K= 0, and the utility function is additive. If S wi„ 1, then K„ 0, and the mathematical form is multiplicative 
(Keeney, 1974; Keeney and Raiffa, 1976; Fishburn, 1982). 
5 The approximation of the additive formulation to the real multiattribute function, supported by several empirical 
studies, is explained by some authors on the basis of psychological reasons (Dawes and Corrigan, 1974; Einhorn 
and Hogart, 1975; Dawes, 1979).   6
2. A pay-matrix is obtained optimising each objective. We also obtain an m by n 
variable-objective matrix, where n is the number of objectives and m the number of 
crops to be considered as alternatives. Each element of the matrix, xij represent the 
area of crop i when the objective j is optimized. 
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where wj are the weights attached to each objective (the solution), xij are the 
elements of the decision variable-objective matrix and xi the observed area of crop i.  
4. Normally, there is not an exact solution to the above system, and it is therefore 
necessary to solve a problem by minimizing the sum of deviational variables that find 
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where ni and pi are the negative and positive deviations respectively. 
5. Dyer (1977) demonstrates that the weights obtained in the previous system are 
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where kj is a normalising factor. 
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Thus, the utility function (7) is normalized by the difference between the ideal (fj
*) and the anti-
ideal (fj*) of the different objectives, and choosing the mathematical expression of the attributes 
as their utility function, fj
 (X), minus the anti-ideal (fj*). 
 
This methodology differs from that of Sumpsi et al. (1993 and 1997) and Amador et al. (1998) in 
the goal-programming exercise employed to calculate the weights. The former authors use the 
pay-off matrix, based on objectives, instead of the decision variable-objective matrix. A similar 
approach can be found in Van Huylenbroeck et al. (2001). 
 
Both approaches are the equivalent of regression analysis, where the weights are the 
coefficients to be estimated. In our approach, however, we improve the estimation by 
increasing the number of “observations”, since, in most situations, the number of activities, 
m, exceeds the number of objectives, n. 
 
Another advantage of this approach lies in the fact that we use observed dependent 
variables and it is not necessary to estimate unobserved values of the objective functions. 
Besides, normalization is not required in the minimization of the deviational variables, ni and 
pi, since all are measured in the same units (hectares). 
 
The empirical results show that, in most cases, the method proposed in this paper 
outperforms the original one in terms of its ability to accurately reproduce the individual 
farmer’s observed behaviour. Consequently, the modifications to the method proposed by 
Sumpsi et al. (1993 and 1997) result in an additive utility function that can be used as an 
instrument which is capable of reproducing the observed behaviour of the farmer. 
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§ Objectives in the multiattribute utility function 
 
The objectives included in the analysis were based on a survey of the study area, which 
revealed the objectives that farmers consider in their decision-making process to choose a 
crop plan. The objectives mentioned were: 
 
- Maximization of total gross margin (TGM), as a proxy of profit in the short run. TGM is 
obtained from the average crop gross margins from a time series of seven years 
(1993/1994 to 1999/2000) -constant euros of 2000-. 
- Minimization of risk, measured as the variance of the TGM (VAR). The risk is thus 




, where [Cov] is the variance-covariance matrix of the crop 
gross margins during the 7-year period, and  X
r
is the crop decision vector. 
- Minimization of  total labour input (TL). This objective implies not only a reduction in 
the cost of this input but also an increase in leisure time and the reduction of 
managerial involvement (labour-intensive crops require more technical supervision). 
- Minimization of working capital (K). This has the aim of reducing the level of 
indebtedness. 
 
These objectives, which are selected a priori by farmers, are analysed in accordance with the 
methodology described above, making it possible to assess the importance of each objective 
in the decision making process. 
 
§ Multiattribute utility function and Arrow-Pratt risk aversion coefficient 
 
Using expression (8) and the information on farmers’ objectives obtained from the survey, we 
can build the additive utility function as follows: 
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In order to reconcile the proposed methodology with the MAUT and EUT approach we need 
to establish the expected utility of the previous expression to be maximized by the decision 
maker. Since expression (9) does not have any random element and includes the first two 
moments of the total gross margin, its expected value and variance, we conclude that, within 
the context of MAUT, this expression is simultaneously both the decision-maker’s 
multiattribute utility function and his/her expected utility. 
 
To calculate the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion coefficients (ra and rr) from the former expression 
we need to divide it into three parts: the first part includes the first and second moment of the 
total gross margin, and the other two correspond to the two last elements. As we do so, we 
see the resemblance between the first part and the mean-variance analysis. 
 
The Pareto optimum set of the EUT approach coincides with the E-V locus only under certain 
conditions of the decision-maker’s utility function (quadratic) or the form of the distribution 
function of the variable that provides utility, in our case the TGM
6. Both conditions are rarely 
observed in reality
7, yet a number of works justify the use of the E-V analysis. Thus, Tsiang 
(1972) supports it when the risk involved is small in comparison with the total wealth of the 
decision-maker. This condition applies to most farmers in Western countries that own their 
                                                        
6 Meyer (1987) and Meyer and Rasche (1992) prove that a sufficient condition to find the optimum of the EUT 
within the E-V set relates to the difference of parameters of the random variables in location and scale. This 
condition, however, is not easy to implement in the continuous space (the cropping pattern) we move. 
7 As Pratt (1964) points out, a quadratic utility function implies an increasing marginal utility, hypothesis rejects by 
the observation of reality. Likewise, a normal distribution of the variable is not easily assumed. Yet, by the central 
limit theorem, when the number of variables, crop gross margins, is sufficiently high, the sum of them, the total 
gross margin, approximately follow a normal distribution, irrespectively of the distribution form of the initial 
variables.   8
land and machinery since the risk involved is much lower than his/her wealth. Likewise, Levy 
and Markowitz (1979) and Kroll et al. (1984) have demonstrated that the E-V analysis is a 
good approximation to reality even when these conditions are not met. 
 
Thus, assuming that the expected utility of the TGM can be approximated by the Taylor 
series of the two first moments, mean and variance, the decision-maker’s utility function can 
be expressed as follows: 
[ ] TGM TGM E TGM U E
2
2
) ( ) ( s
l
- =     (10) 
where ë is the ra coefficient (Pratt, 1964). Taking expected values we have: 
[ ] VAR
TMG r




) ( - =     (11) 
Furthermore, linking Expressions (11) and (9), we can consider the first two elements of the 
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where ki is the difference between the ideal (fj*) and the anti-ideal (fj*). 
 
From expression (12) we see that it is possible to obtain the risk aversion coefficients (ra and 
rr) by similarity with expression (11)
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§ Constraints in the models 
 
The constraints considered in the models utilised to obtain the pay-off and objective-activities 
matrix were: 
 
- The sum of decision variables is equal to or lower than the farm size. 
- European Common Agricultural Policy constraints (set-aside requirements and sugar-
beet quotas). 
- Rotational constraints as expressed by the farmers questioned in the survey. 
- Market constraints that limit the amount of risky crops according to traditional 
practices. 
- Water availability. 
 
2.3. Relationship between the farmer’s risk attitude and socio-economic variables 
 
The mathematical programming method proposed in this paper allows the calculation of the 
risk aversion coefficients for a particular level of TGM. Thus, we cannot obtain the value of 
these coefficients for other levels of TGM than the observed ones since this would require 
the elicitation of the farmer’s utility function. Indeed, expression (9) is only a local 
approximation to the real utility function. Therefore, this local measure of risk aversion cannot 
be used to infer IARA, CARA or DARA (or IRRA, CRRA or DRRA) behaviour. However, they 
do represent, for that level of TGM, the relative importance of risk in their decision-making 
process. 
 
                                                        
8 The possibility of joining EUT and MCDM had been already pointed by Romero et al. (1988, p.275) in the 
context of compromise-risk programming (CRP).   9
Nevertheless, since it is important to determine how these risk coefficients change with the 
level of wealth in order to evaluate the impact of alternative agricultural policies, we can 
regress ra and rr on the level of TGM for all farmers. The regression models, ra=ƒ(TGM) and 
rr=ƒ(TGM), considered were: linear, exponential, reciprocal (X, Y and double), logarithmic, 
multiplicative, square root (X and Y), S-curve, logistic and log-probit; we then chose the 
model with the highest R
2. The slope indicates the aggregated farmers’ attitude to risk: a 
statistically significant slope implies the rejection of CARA and CRRA, a negative slope 
would suggest DARA and DRRA, and finally, a positive slope IARA and IRRA.  
 
Furthermore, it is interesting to relate the ra and rr coefficients to other socio-economic 
variables. We also resorted to multivariate regression analysis to estimate the relationship to 
the following variables: 
 
- Farm size 
- Percentage of land ownership 
- Age 
- Family size 
- Percentage of income from farming 
- Education (years of schooling). 
 
3. Case study 
 
The case study is a community of irrigators located in Northern Spain, Los Canales del Bajo 
Carrión, in the county of Palencia. This community has 6,554 irrigated hectares and 889 
farmers. It has a typical continental climate, 700 m above sea level, with long, cold winters 
and hot, dry summers. Rain falls mostly in spring and autumn. During winter the main crops 
are wheat and barley, in the summer mainly maize, sugar beet and sunflower. During the 
summer it is necessary to irrigate to bring the crops to the harvestable stage.  
 
The main irrigation systems are furrow for most crops and spraying for sugar beet. In 
decreasing order of importance, the average crop distribution is winter cereals, maize, alfalfa, 
sugar beet, and sunflower.  
 
A survey of 52 farmers selected at random was used to gather the necessary data to build 
the models (crop area, costs, yields and constraints) and describe the socio-economic 





4.1. Estimation of the multiattribute utility functions 
 
Utilising the methodology explained in Section 2, we were able to obtain the weighting (wi) 
that each farmer attached to the optimization of each objective.  
 
The results show that the maximization of total gross margin is the most important objective 
with an average weighted importance of 56.4%, followed by the minimization of risk with an 
average weighting of 31.8%. The objectives of the maximization of leisure time and the 
minimization of working capital, with relative weights of 9.2% and 2.5% respectively, seem to 
be less important. The following figure summarizes the cumulative distribution of the 



















Fig. 1. Cumulative probability of the weighting of each objective. 
 
As we can see in Figure 1, 51% of farmers have the maximization of the total gross margin 
(w1>0.5) as their first priority. The importance of this objective is complete (w1=1) for 29% of 
the sample. In the case of minimization of risk, we observe how 35% of farmers give this a 
weight greater than 0.5, and that 10% consider it as their only objective (w2=1). Finally, with 
respect to the other two objectives, only 8% of farmers consider the maximization of leisure 
time very important (w3>0.5), while none of them regard the minimization of working capital 
as important. 
 
In summary, the two most important objectives are the maximization of total gross margin 
and the minimization of risk. However it is important to include other objectives in the utility 
function in order to capture other behavioural attitudes that enable us to estimate more 
accurately the risk aversion coefficients. 
 
4.2. Separate analysis of the risk aversion coefficients 
 
The results obtained from Equations (13) are presented in Figures 2 and 3. As we can see, 
the ra and rr coefficients achieve relatively high values, with an average of 0.00010 (in 1/€) 
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It is important to note the low significance of the mean value due to the wide range of results 
in the sample. Similar wide dispersal of values in agriculture has been pointed out by other 
authors, including Moscardi and Janvry (1977), Dillon and Scandizzo (1978), Binswanger 
(1980 and 1981), Sri-Ramaratman et al. (1987) and Antle (1987 and 1989). 
 
Moreover, Figures 2 and 3 reveal that there is a high proportion of farmers (45%) for whom 
risk aversion is not a factor at all (ra=rr=0), that is, farmers whose behaviour is not explained 
by risk minimization (w2=0), since they seek to maximize profits and leisure time and to 
minimize working capital. On the other hand, a number of farmers (41%) place a low 
weighting on the objective of profit maximization (w1<0.2-0.3), with a rather conservative 
pattern of behaviour (rr>6). This high risk-aversion value is due to the high weighting 
attached to risk minimization and/or the minimization of total labour and working capital. 
 
We thus conclude that there are two distinctive groups of farmers who are divided by their 
attitudes toward risk rather than by their farm endowments. These results explain why 
different management decisions (i.e. crop plans) can be found within an area with 
homogeneous resources (climate, soil, etc.). As a result, a range of different responses can 
be expected for the same agricultural policy stimulus. 
 
We also found a further group (20%) of farmers with extremely high risk aversion 
coefficients, who ignore the maximization of profit (w1=0). These farmers own very large 
farms that provide them with risk-free income from the direct area payments. These farms 
are sown with crops that require low working capital and do not need a great deal of 
managerial involvement (high values of w3 and w4). 
 
4.3. Analysis of the global structure of risk aversion 
 
The regression analysis of the risk aversion coefficients on a proxy of wealth (TGM) revealed 
that, in the case of ra, the best fit was obtained by the following logarithmic formulation: 
 
ra = 0.00401 – 0.00035·ln(TGM)                                          (14) 
(R
2= 0.34; slope significant at the 99% level) 
 
According to this formulation, the farmers in this community exhibit decreasing absolute risk 
aversion (DARA), in line with most related studies, such as Wiens (1976), Binswanger (1980 
and 1981), Lins et al. (1981), Hamal and Anderson (1982), Chavas and Holt (1990 and 
1996), Saha et al. (1994), Feinerman and Finkelshtain (1996), Bar-Shira et al. (1997) and 
Saha (1997). 
 
However, for the relative risk aversion coefficient it was not possible to find any clear 
relationship with the TGM (all models with R
2 lower than 0.20, and no statistically significant 
slopes). It follows, therefore, that we cannot either accept or reject IRRA (or DRRA) for this 
group of farmers. However, the scattergraph rr-TGM suggests an almost horizontal 
relationship, that is, CRRA. This would support the results of other studies, e.g. Lins et al. 
(1981), Binswanger and Sillers (1983), Myers (1989) and Pope and Just (1991). 
 
The previous results are limited to the aggregated behaviour of this group of farmers. Thus, it 
might well be possible to find individual farmers who differ significantly from the average. 
However, as we have pointed out, this method is intended to explain the aggregated 
behaviour. 
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4.4. The risk aversion coefficients and the socio-economic variables 
 
The following table show the Pearson correlation coefficient of both risk aversion coefficients 
and the selected socio-economic variables: 
 
Table 1. Pearson correlation coefficients of ra and rr and some socio-economic variables. 
ra  rr   
Pearson r 
p-value 
(H0: r = 0)  Pearson r 
p-value 
(H0: r = 0) 
Total gross margin  -0.33  0.022  -0.09  0.551 
Farm size  -0.26  0.072  0.01  0.954 
Percentage of ownership  -0.22  0.125  -0.08  0.569 
Farmer’s age  0.30  0.036  0.17  0.255 
Farmer’s family size  0.12  0.410  0.15  0.309 
Percentage of income from farming  -0.03  0.824  0.21  0.160 
Farmer’s education  -0.06  0.700  0.11  0.445 
 
As we can see, significant correlations exist only between some of the socio-economic 
variables and the absolute risk aversion coefficient. The significant relationships were: 
 
- Total gross margin. This result corresponds with the DARA assumption. 
- Farm size. This correlation can be explained by the high correlation between TGM 
and farm size (r>0.90). Therefore, in the multivariate analysis, TGM and farm size will 
not be simultaneously included in the model to avoid multicolinearity problems. 
- Farmer’s age. The older the farmer the higher his/her risk aversion. This result is in 
line with other studies. 
 
Other studies have found a positive correlation with the farmer’s education and with the 
percentage of hired land (Moscardi and Janvry, 1977; Dillon and Scandizzo, 1978; 
Binswanger, 1980; Feinerman and Finkelshtain, 1996). 
 
From this evidence, the attitude of farmers to risk seems to be the result of psychological 
rather than of socio-economic causes. A multidisciplinary approach would therefore be 
required to obtain more conclusive results.  
 
In spite of the poor fit, we made a multivariate linear regression analysis of ra on the TGM 
and the socio-economic variables (stepwise method), with the following estimates: 
 
Table 2. Multivariate linear regression of ra on TGM and farmer’s age. 
Variable  Coefficient  Student’s t  p-value 
Intercept  -0.000147  -0.317  0.7529 
Total gross margin  -5.322 · 10
-9  -2.147  0.0372 
Farmer’s age   1,955 · 10




The principal conclusions to be drawn from this study can be summarized as follows. 
 
Regarding the methodology: 
 
- Since farmers’ decision-making processes simultaneously involve several different 
objectives, it is shown that the reduction of the problem to a utility function with a sole 
monetary attribute does not fully explain his/her behaviour. Our approach includes 
non-monetary objectives in a multi-criteria decision-making technique in order to 
overcome this limitation.   13
- The methodology employed allows the risk aversion coefficients to be calculated, 
unlike the econometric approach, using a minimum amount of data. This feature 
makes it particularly suitable for agricultural systems in view of the lack of data that is 
typical of this sector. 
 
Regarding the results: 
 
- It is interesting to note the wide range of weightings attached to the objectives. This 
results in a high variability of the risk-aversion coefficients. In this sense, we can 
divide the sample into two groups: those farmers whose risk-aversion coefficients are 
close to zero (ra and rr»0), (about 45%); and those with an extremely high relative 
risk-aversion coefficient (rr>6), (about 41%). 
- The high percentage of farmers with a high relative aversion to risk indicates that we 
cannot consider this as “paranoid” behaviour (Anderson and Dillon, 1992), and this 
term should perhaps be reserved for rr values above 10. 
- Average behaviour suggests DARA, and less clearly CRRA, for this group of farmers. 
- The inclusion of socio-economic variables in the explanation of the risk aversion 
coefficients did not yield satisfactory results. Only the farmer’s age is positively 
correlated with the ra coefficient, suggesting that psychological variables may have a 
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